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Charles Guignon, in his recent critique of Heidegger,1 argues that 
Heidegger deflates the skeptical attitude by showing that it has concerned 
itself only with an illusion: gone astray in the dark wood of the subject-
object relation. Neither the subject nor the object need justification; both 
are constructs around a single human MBeing-in-the-world.H A hiatus 
arises, for Guignon, in Heidegger's account of language, however, between 
an instrumental and a constitutive view, fairly allegorizing the classical 
duality (HPK,118). The first view considers language a tool to express 
meanings or intentions already "there" as prior object or content (e.g. 
Condillac). The second pictures language as a medium in which "man 
dwells;" we arrive at apprehension of the world and its meanings through 
the articulatory structure of language (e.g. Wittgenstein). Guignon 
suggests Heidegger opts for the second, at least in his later writings 
("poetically man dwells"), but goes on to add that if the structure of 
understanding is already a grasp of the world ("There is a prior grasp of the 
non-semantic field of significance of the world which becomes the basis 
for gaining mastery over a language."), then language is also instrumental. 
Though Dasein is the bridge that constitutes its two riverbanks as subject 
and object, nothing bridges the gap between the grasp of given contextual 
language and language's grasp of the human (as human dwelling place). 
On Guignon's account, Heidegger's indecision on language shifts the 
duality to two aspects of the Anyone (Guignon's translation of "das Man"), 
the context of intelligibility (the Anyone as social context, and the Anyone 
as morass of inauthentlcity). This produces what Guignon calls the 
problem of reflexlviry—meaning that the results of a critique can be 
reflected back onto the critique itself (HPK,209). If Being and Time is 
context-dependent for its language, if it is an instrumental use of language 
from the period "into which it is thrown" (HPK^08), the "essentiality" of the 
structures of Dasein transcending the subject-object relation is eroded. 
Two things are neglected in Guignon's account. First, for Heidegger, 
such critical circularities as reflexivity are positive; he resides within them. 
And second, to undermine the metaphysical account of consciousness, 
one must speak without bespeaking; as soon as the subject (matter) is 
Acknowledgement: Special thanks to Molly Arrow whose friendship and 
dialogue contributed immeasurably to this project. 
1Guignon, Charles; Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge (Hackett: 
Indianapolis, 1983). Hereafter cited in the text as HPK. 
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articulated and defined, it becomes metaphysical.2 Heidegger must 
remain indecisive about language because his concern is non-language, a 
non-articulation of consciousness, or intentionality. Guignon's insights do 
not seem off base; he is simply claiming as a problem what Heidegger has 
already accepted as necessity. 
Heidegger appears to confront himself with three monsters: circularity, 
Inarticulability, and a hiatus in his text. In a sense, the hiatus suggests a 
textual schizophrenia, in which Heidegger's language, as a wholly personal 
metaphor structure, confounds itself with a meta-language (in a way we 
shall attempt to reveal),3 from which there arises both an exclusion and an 
overlay between the Anyone and Befog-in-the-world.4But rather than look 
at these "monsters" as problems within a rational framework, as Gulgnon 
does, we shall attempt to reveal what they mean as signs. This will require 
reconnoitering the material of which they are molded-a journey through 
an inferno of circularities, to their very center where one should see the 
entire circle. 
Vestibule: the First Circle 
In Being and Time,* we enter a realm of circles. The circle Is 
Heidegger's ground, the way his text configures itself: Being is the basis for 
the meaning of Being; the meaning of Being is the basis for the 
unknowability of Being; the unknowabillty of Being Is the basis for Being. 
When the search for ground finds only what Is grounded, 
equiprimordially, in itself (the Gadamerian hermeneutic circle), then only 
the circle is ground. This configuration is common to the terrain of 
philosophy. Any account of consciousness or theory of intentionality 
assumes a circularity; it requires itself In order to understand itself. Mind 
looks at mind and finds mind self-consciously set out upon the road to find 
itself. What fascinates about Heidegger is that though he too. sets out to 
find, he does so by erasing the presence of mind at both ends of the 
search, and red reaming what is already there. 
2 Jacques Derrida has been at greatest pains to point this out. See the 
article, "Ousia and Gramme," in Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, trans. 
Alan Bass (Chicago, 1982), p. 60. See, also, The Ends of Man" in the same 
volume 
3For a discussion of this notion of schizophrenia, see Bateson, Gregory; 
Steps Toward an Ecology of the Mind (Ballantlne: N.Y., 1972). 
4Guignon points this out with respect to historicity. See Guignon, op. tit, p. 
214-5. 
5Heidegger, Martin, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward 
Robinson (Harper; New York, 1962). Hereafter cited in the text in 
parentheses. 
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In 'The Ends of Man," Derrlda claims that Heidegger has generally 
been misread.6 He locates the source of this misreading in Sartre, who 
seems to re-position Heidegger in metaphysics.7 But Sartre is just the fall 
guy. Because Heidegger attempts to avoid the metaphysical in a poetic 
and elliptical language, to read him or to use him textually is already to 
undo that endeavor. If he is not misread, he must be miswritten. His own 
journey's agon, then, is not to "miswrite" himself, but to live in the 
interstices between text and non-text He writes a text that acheives its 
content in non-articulation (a text that is what it is not), and that formally 
cancels its own form (a text that is not what it is). His text duplicates the 
Sartrean "metaphysics" of the fbr-itself. Sartre bespeaks in content what 
Heidegger has already done in form. The divided nature of Heidegger's 
text, touched on by Guignon, is isomorphic to Sartre's 'divided self.8 
If Heidegger's purpose is to generate a text that evades the assumptions 
and presuppositions of metaphysics, then his task is to generate an 
intelligible signified for a unarticulated yet still intelligible signifies To 
^The Ends of Man," op.dt. 
7The bone of contention is the 'structure of consciousness.' Heidegger sees 
Sartre and Husserl losing themselves in the primacy of consciousness, 
while he himself relinquishes his hold on logos, leaping toward what 
precedes articulation. Heidegger suggests that structures of 
consciousness have no foundational meaning, that they are falsified 
superstructures, because thinking, to take account of the 'truth of Being,' 
must already reside in the inarticulable. 
8In the "Letter on Humanism," Heidegger attempts to deal with this 
schizophrenia, but only ends up adding to it. In Martin Heidegger, Basic 
Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell (Harper; New York, 1977), we find: 
Thinking Is of Being inasmuch as thinking, coming to pass from 
Being, belongs to Being. At the same time, thinking is of Being insofar 
as thinking, belonging to Being, listens to Being. As the belonging to 
Being that listens, thinking is what it is according to its essential origin. 
Thinking is. (Basic Writings, p. 196) 
Thinking becomes both the state of Being and the act of accomplishing. 
It is overdetermined. 
Dasein itself reveals its own hiatus. As jemeines, the personal, Dasein 
is particular, while in its inarticulateness, it remains non-particular. 
Heidegger over-generalizes in that Dasein remains disembodied like an 
ether in the world, and he over-specifies in that Dasein is but an aspect of 
the organism (an "office-holder," as Guignon points out — HPK,104). 
Dasein is both over-generalized in transcending experience in the 
presence of the earthy, and over-specified in being what experiences in 
the absence of experiential "aboutness." 
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fulfill this purpose, 'the meaning of Being' must make sense, and yet 
remain non-metaphysical. The question of intelligibility (of the meta-text 
of that intelligibility) is,' for Heidegger, the question of how the non-text 
'makes sense.' The circular, the unartlculated, and the hiatic are three 
ways textual content is decentered and dissolved. To fulfill itself, 
Heidegger's textual surface must enter a Dantean Limbo9 of non-
structure, non-telos, and non-method. 
To apprehend, without rewriting what is inarticulable in Heidegger's 
text, one must grasp its form. The form of writing, however, hides behind 
the ghostly presence of content that emerges from the printed page, like a 
photograph submerged in developer. If that form exists, it must have a 
medium. Instead of words, or sentences, philosophy's medium is the rules 
of logic and grammar. A sculpting of sentences, in a style of reasoning, 
occurs in this medium, like working with clay. Though the text's 
"sculptural" content is ephemeral, an absence, its "sculptural" form, 
discerned in the lens of a meta-text, Is nevertheless present, a signifier that 
points to an unartlculated signified. 
This approach seems particularly appropriate for Heidegger, who seeks 
to reveal the underlying body of Being, behind the screen held by Being 
on which philosophy has traditionally painted its tableaux—a screen 
rendered visible only by the paintings on it. Heidegger desires to strip 
away the screen and paint the very body of Being, to silhouette it in his 
poetics. This essay will attempt to encounter the body of Heidegger's text. 
Our guide in this task warns us that we will have to cleave to Heidegger's 
semantics (as our own medium) and feel our way around. 
The Second Circle 
In Being and Time, Heidegger directly addresses the question of 
circularity three times, in three different ways. The first time, he answers 
the charge of logical circularity. In the "interrogation of Being," a Being is 
required whose mode of Being is to question Being, and which "gets its 
essential character from what is inquired about-namely. Being." (27) 
Syllogistically, the argument dissolves in presuppositions; each is already 
the essential condition for the other. But Heidegger demurs; his project is 
descriptive rather than deductive. 
It is quite impossible for there to be any 'circular argument' in 
formulating the question about the meaning of Being; for in 
answering this question, the issue Is not one of grounding something 
'Allusions to Dante's Inferno will use the language of John Ciardi's 
translation (NAL; New York, 1954). Since that will be done in a fairly free-
form fashion, as a metaphor structure and source of images, no references 
will be given. 
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by... a derivation; It is rather one of laying bare the grounds for it and 
exhibiting them. (28) 
The difference is between logical consequence and ontological 
precedence. The first moves forward toward derived results, the other 
moves backward toward foundations. Dasein's subject matter and its 
mode of inquiry are the same thing. 
If we must first define an entity in its Being, and if we want to 
formulate the question of Being only on this basis, what is this but 
going in a circle? (27) 
Some commentators interpret this 'attitude' of Heidegger's as implying a 
desire to think in the circle.10 Heidegger would accept that ontologically, 
and reject its logical form. In the passage above, he uses the term "circle" 
in its "logical" sense, while ontologically its meaning is quite different. For 
him, it refers, instead, to "a remarkable 'relatedness backward and 
forward"' (28). The fact of Being as questioning, implies it is an act of Being 
whose attention to itself as interrogation looks back at where it came from. 
Consciousness, ahead of itself, looks back at itself revealed as already up 
ahead11—as Paolo and Francesca look back at their having foreseen their 
fate in the whirlwind. The act of revealing takes itself as its presupposition, 
and presupposition is what is revealed. Being-there reveals Being there, 
and vice versa—like the swing of a pendulum. Logical circularity 
10Taminiaux, for instance, sees what Heidegger is doing with the circle, 
and relates it to Heidegger's "ontological difference." He does not see the 
topological difference between traditional circularity and Heidegger's 
procedure. This does not prevent him, however, from understanding the 
power of the circle to avoid the subject-object duality. Jacques Taminiaux, 
"Finitude and the Absolute," in Heidegger: the Man and the Thinker, ed. 
Thomas Sheehan (Precedent; Chicago, 1981), p. 195-6. 
""Building Dwelling Thinking," in Martin Heidegger; Poetry, Language, 
Thought, trans. Albert Hofstadter (Harper; New York, 1971): 
When I go toward the door of the lecture hall, I am already there, 
and I could not go to it at all if I were not such that I am there. I am 
never here only,... rather, I am there, that is, I already pervade the 
room, and only thus can I go through it. (p.157) 
See also, Martin Heidegger; On the Way to Language, trans. Peter D. 
Hertz (Harper; New York, 1971), p. 12. Hereafter cited as WL. Heidegger 
says: "Only the way back will lead us forward." It is important to notice that 
the forward and backward analytic remains central to both early and later 
writings. 
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transfigures itself into an oscillation between the act of revelation and the 
fact of presupposition. What logic sees as a circle, Heidegger sees a circle 
as. 
This pendulum motion becomes, for Heidegger, an analytic formalism 
in his text. If "already" names the pendulum's backswing, there is "always" 
a forward projection to engage in that backward analytic. The "Always 
Already" names this formalism as a rhetorical style,12 one which conflates 
both the instrumental and constitutive accounts of language. Just as 
Dasein's mode of inquiry emerges from its object (Dasein itself) as 
revealed by that mode, so Heidegger draws a rhetorical procedure from 
his subject matter. 
The Third Circle 
Our guide informs us that here we will receive a foretaste of future 
difficulties that threaten to consume; the circle will open in a different way. 
When Heidegger next addresses the question of circularity, in his 
discussion of understanding, (194) he allows the Always Already, in its form 
as a pendulum arc, to be engulfed by an ontological circle. 
Understanding exists in reciprocity with interpretation. "Understanding" 
names the way Dasein existentially confronts its possibilities in the world, 
and "interpretation" names the act of rendering possibility explicit. As an 
act of Being (which is already revelatory), understanding confronts the fact 
of Being (which is always presupposed). As an act of understanding (which 
is not yet explicit), interpretation conducts the fact of understanding 
(which is no longer only possibility). Understanding founds itself on 
interpretation, and interpretation founds itself on understanding. This 
differs from the Gadamerian hermeneutic circle in that there is a forward 
dynamic to it. Each establishes the other in order to re-establish itself. It is 
like a dialogue in which repetition is impossible because the reiterated 
utterance occurs in the context of having already been spoken, 
distinguishing it from the first. Each expresses the other ontologically, in 
the sense of being the other's mode of existence. 
Any interpretation which is to contribute understanding, must already 
have understood what is to be interpreted. (194). 
12Heidegger himself almost presents it as a formalism in and of Dasein. In 
"The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic," we read: 
Prepositional truth is more primordially rooted, rooted in already-
being-by-things. The latter occurs "already", before making 
statements - since when? Always already! Always, that is, insofar as 
and as long as Dasein exists. Already being with things belongs to the 
existence of Dasein, to its kind and mode of being. (126-7) 
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Yet they do not look back at each other. They move in the different 
dimensions of possibility and explidtness, each finding a form of existence 
In the other. 
If we see this drcle as a vidous one and look for ways of avoiding It,... 
then the act of understanding has been misunderstood.... It is not to 
be reduced to the level of a vidous circle, or even of a drcle which is 
merely tolerated. In the drcle is hidden a positive possibility of the 
most primordial kind of knowing. (195) 
Three configurations are implied here. First, there is still a pendulum 
arc. The discourse on understanding is the core of Heidegger's text; since 
Being and Time is itself an interpretation, an understanding of 
understanding, it returns to itself (reflexively) from its own ontology of 
understanding. In discussing understanding, Heidegger's text looks back 
on its textual act of looking back. But second (unlike the logical drcle, 
which flattens itself to a methodology), the pendulum arc inflates itself into 
an ontological circle, into the shape of Heidegger's content. It is like 
looking at the breakfast cereal box whose side panel design is a boy 
looking at the breakfast cereal box. What is going on inside is what is 
going on outside. A mise-en-abime, it is also an ontological circle; the 
design box brings us back to the box we are looking at at. It refers to itself 
for us by existing for the boy, and refers to itself for the boy by existing for 
us. 
The pendulum arc suggests a third circularity by synechdoche. An arc is 
a truncated drcle; it points to the circle of which it is an arc. The ontological 
circle of understanding points to a supra-ontological (or supra-logical) 
circle that completes it. To paraphrase the example already given: the 
nature of Being is to inquire into the meaning of Being; the meaning of 
Being is to be the Being questioned; to be the Being questioned is the 
nature of Being. Each of these three statements is a pendulum arc. As a 
whole, they fit together like large pie slices. It suggests the story of the 
detective who, setting out to solve a murder that has not yet occurred, finds 
he must commit the murder in order to catch himself as the criminal. The 
meaning and nature of Being, and the inquiry into Being, all belong to 
each other (as do the supra-logical, the ontological, and the logical circles), 
like the three heads of Cerberus. If Heidegger's text is not schizophrenic, it 
is at least a multiple personality. 
It seems we have a glut of circles. Our guide warns us: "What is decisive 
is not to get out of the drcle but to come into it in the right way." (195) To do 
so, a topology of circularity will have to be built; i.e. our guide will be a 
geometrization. 
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The Fourth Circle 
Heidegger returns to address circularity once more (362). The issue is 
presupposition. Our guide comforts us that they are harmless when in 
circular form, though warns that we should be ready for a kind of war of 
reasoning styles. 
Heidegger counterposes the "common sense" attitude toward 
presupposition to that of ontological description. Common sense concerns 
itself with propositional consistency and its logical rules—a consistency it 
thinks will avoid logical circularities. "What common sense wishes to 
eliminate in avoiding the 'circle'" (363) is consciousness' 'act' of being 
ahead of itself. Common sense would rather have language confront its 
propositions as its own foundation: propositions made of language 
insisting on language made of propositions. As a result, it confuses 
factuality (what one "comes across" propositionally) with facticity (the 
content of understanding) in order not to have to understand 
"understanding" in its essential circularity. It buries the very activity that 
encounters, and thus engenders, 'factuality' in the first place (i.e. 
understanding itself). (363) Understood ontologically, logical consistency is 
only an attribute painted on the body of the real relationship between 
language and proposition—a pendulum arc between possibility and 
explidtness. Thus, common sense covers up, in miserly fashion, the vast 
poetic wealth of that relation. 
Ontological description, on the other hand, neither addresses 
propositions nor requires consistency. 
We cannot ever 'avoid' a '€1101181* proof In the existential analytic, 
because such an analytic does not do any proving at all by the rules of 
the 'logic of consistency'. (363) 
It addresses, instead, the pre-condition for there to be pre-suppositlons in 
the first place. "What does presupposition signify?" (362) Heidegger asks. 
What is presupposed in Being's act of inquiry into Being is the fact of 
Inquiry, the situation of its questioning, the 'context of thinking'—which 
Heidegger calls "the hermeneutic situation" (275). 
Hermeneutics means neither the theory of the art of interpretation 
nor interpretation itself, but rather the attempt first of all to define the 
nature of interpretation on hermeneutic grounds. (WL,11) 
That is, "hermeneutic grounds" are the basis upon which analysis can 
proceed: the trancendental conditions for the possibility of interpretation 
and understanding (HPK,62), the foundation of language and thinking. 
What is presupposed in the hermeneutic situation is the point from which 
its own origin can be encountered in interpretation itself. That is, 
hermeneutic grounds are constituted by a relation (an ontological circle) 
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of thinking to language, to text.13 A hermeneutic is both a text about a text 
(i.e. an understanding, a reading) and an understanding of understanding 
(i.e. a text, like Being and Time). Language eternally confronts its own 
foundation, and dispenses itself as its own meta-language. Language and 
"hermeneutic grounds" are "always already" there toward and for each 
other, always already squandering each other. The very extravagance of 
language's expenditure of its resources on itself distinguishes it from the 
penuriousness of logical consistency. 
Thus, the dialectic of prodigal ontology and miserly logic consists of a 
confrontation of similar (arc) structures. These are mediated by a third 
one. In the investigation of understanding, understanding is always ahead 
of itself, while pointing back to what has become it. In the hermeneutic 
situation (a relation of factuality and facticlty, of text and understanding), 
understanding already points out the properties that articulate what it has 
made possible for itself. In other words, predication (or proposition) and 
the hermeneutic situation are 'always already' there for each other as each 
other's ground. 
In effect, three pendulum arcs, engendered by the ontology of 
presupposition in backward and forward analytics, connect the three 
points of discourse (called language, proposition, and the hermeneutic 
situation), one between each pair of terms. These three provide, in reverse 
order, the form, the content, and the ontological mediation (what returns 
understanding to the possibility of prepositional rules) of logic's insistence 
on consistency. They constitute the priority (as itself a meta-linguistic 
situation), the supposing (as language), and the positing (as proposition) of 
pre-supposition. Structurally, they fit together, again like a pie, a wheel of 
interpretation completing the circle synechdochically implied by each 
pendulum arc, and constituting the totality of "pre-supposition." The 
wheel, a supra-logical circle, returns each term to itself as its own source. 
As with Dame Fortune, one can start anywhere; pre-supposition merely 
spins the wheel. 
But Heidegger Is not a gambler. He wishes to know the outcome first. 
We must rather endeavor to leap into the 'circle', primordlally and 
wholly, so that even at the start of the analysis of Dasein we make sure 
that we have a full view of Dasein's circular Being. (363) 
13Language must be included because it belongs to the context of 
intelligibility that founds discourse, from which care derives. The nature of 
care is what logical consistency seeks to avoid. (p.363ff and sect. 34) 
"Language defines the hermeneutic relation." (WL,30) As Guignon points 
out, though understanding is prepredicative, it is not pre-linguistic. 
(HPK,131) 
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Why does Heidegger want to jump into the circle? Because a circularity of 
priority, or ground, implies the circle itself is ground. Though our guide 
assures him that a 'full view' can only be obtained from the center, he does 
not tell Heidegger that if the circle itself is ground, through its center lies 
only the abyss, the psychosis of thinking one is not when one still is. 
Heidegger was to discover this for himself in 1934. 
Where first, Heidegger's circle concerns method, or rhetorical form, 
and second, analytic content, in this third instance, we find him spinning a 
meta-analysis, a meta-text of his analytic. The logical (rhetorical 
pendulum), the ontological (return of understanding to itself), and the 
supra-logical (triadic) circles are brought together, each a topological 
component of a unitary structure (or sculpture). Like the statue hidden 
within the raw block of marble, Heidegger has outlined a structure that 
transcends his own, yet is found only within it. 1 4 
The Fifth Circle 
A sculptural motif (for instance, the notion of presupposition) "names" 
its configuration (its supra-logical circle) in the same way a set of quantum 
numbers—as indices rather than as "measurements"—"name" a subatomic 
particle. The quantum "name" is but an Index pointing to a system of 
quantum mechanical formulas. Similarly, Heidegger's system of names 
for Dasein's existentials function as indices. They are meta-meta- textual 
because they point to a discourse that is already metaphoric for what 
Heidegger does not want to articulate. They are "there" as signifiers, and 
"not there" because as indices they belong to a transcending structure. 
At this point, our guide interjects that the supra-logical circle, the 
implicate structure of Heidegger's "quantum numbers," will be the terrain 
we will traverse. He warns that, as we approach the dry of understanding, 
and enter its gates, we will find a veritable inferno of drcles, a complex 
textile of terms-understanding, interpretation, meaning, and assertion16— 
14There is a structure (or sculpture) of rhetorical forms revealed in this. 
The logical circle is metonymic of the whole; the pendulum arc, as 
rhetorical form, is synechdochic; and the ontological (descriptive) drcle is 
metaphoric In the supra-logical dimension, the act of naming, the act of 
articulating, and the act of meaning endlessly succeed each other as the 
terms of Dasein's search, discovery, and disclosure of itself. And 
Heidegger's rhetorical formalism emerges as a sculpture of rhetorical 
forms that transcends ontological structure. 
15In the following discussion, we will be working with the English translation 
of German words, and constructing relationships of their English 
significations, understood through the use those terms are given. I think it 
is proper to carry on such an analysis wholly in English, not because one 
can be as faithful to the original in English as in German — one can't — but 
because the surrounding discourse is in English, and thus, in translating, a 
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to be entered, in their knottedness, as an environment. But before 
reaching this city, we must cross Heidegger's circle of 'significance', which, 
like the river Styx, marks the division between thinking the circle and 
being in it; it is a marsh of sullen hyphenated (in the English) 
'instrumental' terms. 
An object (action or event) appears, or is discovered, as an 
instrumentality (a "for-the-sake-of-which") for something in which one is 
involved. (121) (Whether event, object, or action, what appears will 
eventually have an 'objective' quality; it is discovery, significance, 
involvement that refer to Dasein's activity or occurence, and thus are the 
quantum numbers). Involvement relates back to the object (in recognition 
or familiarity) and forward to what "for-the-sake-of-which" the object plays 
a role (the hammer is recognized in its role as hammering). And 
"involvement" names the way this pendulum arc is grasped as the object 
itself. Grasping it, however, constitutes an "assignment" of significance. 
Assignment relates backward to involvement with the object as an "in-
order-to," and forward to its usefulness, its "toward-this," toward the object 
and its role as such (one picks up the hammer with a nail in mind). 
"Assignment" names the way this pendulum arc clothes the 'thing' in 
objectivity and purpose, assigns it its significance. But objectivity is already 
an assignment of the object's significance. It relates backwards to the 
assignment that lets something be involved (an "in-which"), and forward to 
an instrumentality, the "with-which" of the object and its role, which 
returns to an "involvement" (the nail permits the hammer to be itself and 
recognized). In other words, recognition both precedes and returns to 
involvement. And "objectivity" names the way this pendulum arc presents 
the object's appearance as Instrumentality.16 Again, these three 
pendulum arcs close upon themselves and constitute a circle, one we shall 
name the "significance-circle." 
structural and connotational overlay Is already in place; it would only be 
muddied by mixing in brief aspects of a German connotational overlay. 
Even if slightly distorted, the translation has already pulled the kernal 
from the German cultural integument. Pieces of that integument might be 
of interest, but are ancillary to this discourse, which is about Heidegger, 
not of him. 
16Heidegger puts this altogether in one quick progression of states: 
The "for-the-sake-of-which" signifies an "in-order-to"; this in turn, a 
"towards-this"; the latter, an "in-which" of letting something be 
involved; and that in turn, the "with-which" of an involvement. These 
relationships are bound up with one another as a primordial totality; 
they are what they are as this signifying (Be-deutenl in which Dasein 
gives itself beforehand its Being-in-the-world as something to be 
understood. (120) 
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This ontology of 'objectivity' is a restatement of the familiar 
phenomenological notion that meaning is the way the world is 
apprehended; familiarity with an object's significance is a precondition for 
the object's revealing itself, and significance is the pre-condition for 
objectivity (120). That is, apprehension of objects and events occurs before 
the fact. The object is separated from its background by prior assignment 
founded on and engendering familiarity. In sum, no part of this structure 
can be said to precede any other. Involvement is constitutive of 
assignment based on objectivity; assignment is constitutive of objectivity 
based on involvement; objectivity is constitutive of involvement based on 
assignment. They are equiprimordial. Each is always the succeeding, and 
already the preceding. The component pendulum arcs do not simply 
attach to each other; they interlock, like a chain. The fact of objectivity is 
the form assignment takes, while the object's content is the act of 
assignment Similarly, the fact of involvement is the form objectivity takes, 
while the content of involvement is the instrumentality of the object, its act 
of objectivity. And finally, assignment Is the form involvement takes, while 
the content of assignment is the act of Involvement. 
Our guide warns us not to become hypnotized by this circle, lest we fall 
Into it. There is activity in this configuration. Each "index" runs to the next 
to find itself hidden, and retreats to the preceding to hide in what will 
disclose it. The sculpture constitutes itself out of meta-textual dynamics, 
scintillations in the conformation of the pendulum arc, the ontological 
circle, and the supra-logical circle. It perhaps should be noted that this 
supra-logical circle is not dialectical; its relations are positive and 
equiprimordial. There is no synthesis, no entelechy. It is a cloud chamber, 
a nebulous realm of quantized motion, an organic whole (named and 
indexed, in this case, by the term "significance") whose reality resides only 
in the braiding of its components-in the same manner that a "steady-
state" in a computer program is constituted by a loop. 
And the object has become what Heidegger desired. It has already been 
pushed beneath the surface of this river of activity where it can no longer 
engender the subject. It dissimulates there, not even as a sign, though 
assigned the equiprimordiality of as-sign(ation) and as-sign(ment) 
constituting themselves as significance].17 
The Sixth Circle 
Thus far, a topology has been built conflating three circular formations— 
a truncated circle (the pendulum arc), an ontological circle, and a supra-
logical circle; these have been used to map the terrain of "significance." 
Our guide tells us that we are entering the central core of Heidegger's 
discourse, where Heidegger presents a heretical view of understanding. Its 
17See Fell, Joseph P.; Heidegger and Sartre (Columbia; New York, 1979), for 
an interesting discussion of objects as dissimulation (e.g. p. 111). 
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topology will become a sign for understanding's Always Already being 
'there', that is, the liere' where it burns, as it were, by its own light. 
Heidegger's account of understanding is traversed in three phases-
possibility, projection, and interpretation. In the first phase, 
"understanding" names the way Dasein confronts its possibilities as an act 
of Being. This means that possibility functions as familiarity that is left 
uncovered, not yet sealed by final judgment, open to involvement. In the 
second phase, understanding finds its possibilities in the world by 
projecting them; that is, it looks ahead, prophetic because it will have 
engendered what it will discover. In projection, it banishes itself to the 
world, becoming what it seeks to understand. "As projecting, 
understanding is the kind of Being of Dasein in which it is its possibilities 
as possibilities." (185) Finally, in the third phase, "interpretation" names 
the act of rendering projected possibility explicit for understanding—i.e. 
the way understanding returns to, or turns upon, itself, a way its future 
catches up with it. These terms-possibility, projection, and interpretation-
exemplify how Heidegger's language parallels quantum numbers as 
indices. They are familiar terms given new possibility because their 
traditional meaning, which underlies their use, is projected upon an 
underlying metaphor ("possibility as possibility") whose content is left 
unartlculated, but whose form is an interpretation that specifies that very 
possibility, and thus returns to itself as pure recognition; like a sub-atomic 
particle—it remains unseen except through the lens of prior familiarity, 
which is projected upon the unseen as its name, the name of a metaphor 
which, thus literalized, becomes what is apprehended. Recognition occurs 
prior to perception. 
In fact, quantum mechanics discloses the same "schizophrenic" nature 
as Heidegger's text. Its meta-meta-metaphoric structure puts it in a 
double bind. It tells itself that its traditional (real world) categories are only 
metaphors for its (quantum) world, but the meta-language it tells itself in, 
which itself metaphorizes those categories, it takes to be the real world. It 
realizes its (quantum world) language is only metaphoric, but to do so 
makes its traditional language real. 
We can sense a circular interlocking between understanding's quantum 
numbers. Projection is the form possibility (as an act) takes, while the fact 
of projection, what is projected, constitutes the content of interpretation. 
Similarly, possibility is always again the form interpretation takes, since it 
founds understanding's possibility for itself, while the fact of possibility 
becomes the content of projection. How interpretation becomes the fact of 
projection in its explidtness will be discovered in the Seventh Circle, but as 
Dasein's own possibility toward itself, interpretation (in its explidtness) is 
always again the content of possibility. Our cloud chamber picture has 
moved to a different energy level. As quantum mechanics sets boundaries 
to the infinitesmal, Heidegger sets boundaries to the strictures of 
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metaphysics, emptying its terms and refilling them with their mutual self-
referential structuring. 
The "understanding-triad" parallels the involvement, assignment, and 
objectivity of the significance-circle; as such, it structures the way meaning 
arrives to the world, and is attributed to it-or, as the Epicureans would say, 
the way the world lives and dies with It. And though, like the damned, 
understanding sees ontologically ahead, its present is hidden from it 
between the already and the not yet, an interstice that it returns to itself as 
possibility; the object or state of affairs, the "aboutness" that bodies forth 
understanding, is eclipsed; possibility, projection, and interpretation 
provide themselves with their own content. The object lies entombed in 
the structure of understanding, and also up ahead, deferred by primordial 
apprehension. 
The Seventh Circle-First Round 
Our guide now confirms our suspicion that these circles whose 
environment we are entering are not concentric; rather they form parts of 
each other, exhibiting a topology that is ever more complex. 
Interpretation, the next circle, and one of the understanding-triad, is itself 
triadic, composed of an as-structure, a fore-structure, and Meaning (Sinn): 
a triad in a triad. 
The first, the as-structure, is "the explidtness of something that is 
understood,"(189) its being "something-as-something." 
We take apart in its 'in-order-to' that which is drcumspectively ready-
to-hand, and we concern ourselves with it in accordance with what 
becomes visible through this process. (189) 
Taking apart' does not signify dismantlement or analysis, but the 
emergence of figure against background. (192) The 'in-order- to' finds its 
form in "what becomes visible" (189), which in turn finds its form in 
"something as something." In other words, in making explidt (though stilt 
pre-predicatively) the possibility of the object (of involvement), the as-
structure renders explicit (assigns) the projection of that possibility as 
object, whose objectivity then emerges "as something." This "as-
something" has already found its form in the 'in-order-to', since it is ready-
to-hand, an instrumentality whose content is "something." The as-
structure topologically recapitulates the significance-circle. The 
significance-circle is not overlaid on the as-structure; it is achdved by it 
through possibility. 
As-ness is specification, a particularization of the significance-circle's 
generalized involvement. As such, the as-structure completes 
involvement. In its separation of object from background, it allows 
involvement to reveal itself in the object disclosed. If involvement is like a 
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hunter that aims to keep for itself the object it has disclosed to itself, then 
the as-structure marks its arrow's success in hitting the target. Where the 
term 'significance' named an entityhood (the significance-circle itselD, the 
term "as-structure" names an eye through which entityhood in general (as 
figure) can be discerned. That is, the object swims there in circumscribed 
or silhouetted entityhood. The as-structure particularizes the content of 
significance, and generalizes its form. 
In a sense, this first structure of interpretatlon-already of the objective-
can be construed as perception. Heidegger was not openly speaking of 
perception here, but he has presented the projected facticity that 
characterizes perceptual cognition. Like Nietzsche, Heidegger is 
providing a structureless structure for perception that precludes both the 
will-less or "uninvolved" perceiver and the notion of true objectivity. It is 
structureless because the content of perception is in the act, not the state; 
it is a structure because its equiprimordiality determines one for it: a 
triadic circle. Yet, there is an assumption that Heidegger makes, a thought 
that he leaves unthought, a memory left forgotten about memory, that 
undermines his evasion of non-involvement. We shall return to it below. 
It is worth noting that perception has traditionally resisted linear 
description or representation; perhaps casting it as a triadic circularity 
suggests why. Any account of perception must incarnate processes of 
recognition (involvement as something—l.e. possibility), attribution 
(assignment, accomplished as projection), and pointing out the object 
(engendering objectivity, i.e. interpretation), while at the same 
apprehending these components as separately namable. As Empedocles 
has said (via Dante): if discrete elemental matter should feel harmony and 
fly together, all would be chaos. The drcle holds them apart, without the 
absolute independence of linear analysis. 
The Seventh Circle-Second Round 
The as-structure ontologically positions (inscribes, rather than 
establishes) objectivity; the next, the fore-structure, projects projection 
onto the notion of projection. Composed of what Heidegger calls fore-
having, fore-sight, and fore-conception, it is also a triad in the 
interpretation triad. 
Each aspect of the fore-structure represents a different relation to what 
is 'in advance.' The first, fore-having, as an "act of appropriation", is 
"interpretation... grounded in something we have in advance" (191). What 
we have in advance is the ability to recognize pursuant to involvement; it is 
not yet one that makes the "as-something" fully specific, "stand out from 
the background" as more than general objectivity. Objecthood obtains to 
possibility, but not yet to understanding's specified possibility for itself. 
Fore-having flows in what is still hidden in understanding, and bleeds out 
toward the object as its already lived involvement. 
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We could not say It represented 'prior experience' for two reasons; first, 
Heidegger's notion of either 'lived experience' or ontic erfahren occur in 
the 'present;' and second, prior experience would imply cognition. On the 
other hand, fore-having seems to hold the 'two keys' to the aporia of 
Husserl's noema. His account implies that the noematlc correlate must be 
prescribed to be recognized and recognized to be prescribed. Fore-having 
presents itself as appropriation prior to specification, but mediated 
through the circular structure enacting projection. The "noema" is 
mapped onto a recognition always prior to possibility being already "for-
the-sake-of- which." 
As a first unveiling of the object, fore-having Is already a disclosure seen 
from a point of view, In "fore-sight". Fore-sight is "something we see in 
advance." It directs projected possibility to what is already encountered 
because it already sees. It knows where to look. This is not seeing ahead 
into the future (as the Inferno's denizens do), but having seen ahead 
already to the present as familiarity. It sets the object against its 
surrounding, like singling out a bush against its surrounding woods, which 
then effloresces as presence-at-hand. In guiding the "act of appropriation," 
fore-sight becomes the form fore-having takes. 
Fore-sight gives appropriation a target, something to apprehend; and its 
form of apprehension is conceptual. Thus, finally, fore-conception is the 
decision to conceive the object in a definite way, as "something we grasp in 
advance." "Decision" does not signify intentionality or decision 
procedures, but highlights the involvement which ontologically grounds 
the object in understanding. Rather than the object being brought more 
and more into focus, fore-conception is the ontological objectivity from 
which the object apprehended slowly forms toward the world, and thus in 
the world. 
Anything understood which is held in our fore-having and towards 
which we set our sights 'foresightedly', becomes conceptualizable 
through the interpretation,... drawn from the entity itself. (191) 
Fore-conception is the form fbre-sightedness takes, while the "what" of 
fore-sight provides its content. 
And finally, since the fore-conception, as conceptualizability, is what we 
"have in advance" to ground our apprehension of the object, fore-having is 
the form fore-conception takes. Fore-conception bespeaks the object's 
particularity through the act of fore-having, for which it becomes the 
content. What is appropriated, in its fore-having, becomes the content of 
what is seen.18 The fore-structure too becomes a full circle of braided form 
18Again, there is a relation to Husserl; the moment of the noetic act has 
already, and not yet, prescribed the object in noematic correlation. That is, 
as an explicit awareness (recognition, attention to, grasping), the fore-
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and content. And In its apprehension of the object, it provides the form for 
the projected explidtness of the as-structure. 
To summarize the supra-logical drcle: Its three indices (or terms) name 
three pendulum arcs that interlock to form a whole circle (like pie slices). 
Each arc signifies an "Always Already" structure of precedence and 
succession in equiprimordiality. (For instance, fore-sight both succeeds 
fore-having and precedes it as what guides appropriation.) That each 
index finds its form in the next, and receives its content from the 
preceding constitutes the Interlock. To find its form in the next means it 
manifests itself 'there' in a form for which it then provides itself as the 
content. This imparts a directionality to the drcle, a directionality which 
essentially represents the opening of the pendulum arc into an ontological 
circle, where the "forward and backward motion" returns to its starting 
index through the mediation of the third index. For instance, in the 
significance- drcle, the forward and backward relationship of involvement 
and assignment moves forward to assignment and backward to 
involvement through objectivity. In other words, the indices remain 
separate, but without independence, as if something previously torn 
asunder had been welded back together. Heidegger's project of evading 
metaphysics leads to a reconstitution of a transtextual analysand from 
which the metaphysical categories, which he has transformed into indices, 
can be considered to have been drawn, or analysed. 
The Seventh Circle-Third Round 
Our guide now cautions us to follow him closely; this next index will not 
only be a drcle itself, but it will close two others-the interpretation circle 
and the understanding-circle of which that is a part-and thus complete a 
substructure of the overall topology. This is the circle of Meaning, he adds; 
we are getting down to the nucleus. 
Meaning is the upon-which of a projection in terms of which 
something becomes intelligible as something; it gets its structure from 
a fore-having, a fore-sight, and a fore-conception. (193) 
This passage seems to be a conflation of the interpretation-circle's 
previous indices. Its syntactical form parallels that of the as-structure 
(The explidtness of something that is understood ... has the structure of 
something as something."), while its poetic form (its relations of terms) 
reflects the possibility-triad, as if the one were a sand-bed, a ground on 
which to operate, and the other fell into it from above. Thus: "Something (a 
possibility seen) becomes (is projected as) intelligible (conceived) as 
structure seems to name the formal aspect of a structure of intentionality; 
structurally, it hides within itself, as a ellipsis, what will represent the 
speaker, the seer, the doer. 
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something (an objectivity appropriated)." Meaning is presented as 
equiprimordially fore-having (or 'as-something') dissolved in objectivity, 
fore-conception carried by projection, and fore-sight embedded in 
possibility. Possibility, projection, and objectivity, in their collective guise 
as the as-structure, are conducted by fore-sight, fore-conception, and fore-
having respectively, to become the circle of Meaning. Meaning becomes 
the name for fore-seen possibility receiving its content from objectivity as-
something, which has received its content from projected fore-conception, 
and which, in turn, has received its content from fore-seen possibility. 
Following the route charted by the significance-circle. The as-structure 
flows over the fore-structure to Meaning, as over a stream bed. In other 
words, Meaning finds its form "as something," and its content in the fore-
conception. The process of specification, from objectivity through what is 
In advance" (primordial recognition), becomes manifest as Meaning. As 
such, it transcends possibility, absorbs projection, and embeds objectivity 
in itself. 
In completing the explidtness of understanding, and taking as its own 
substance the fore-structure, Meaning completes interpretation as a 
triadic circle. Similarly, the understanding triad is completed. In 
interpretation, understanding becomes what it already was. Interpretation 
conceptualizes what possibilities are projected; possibility appropriates 
what projections are interpreted; and projection sees what interpretation 
presents as possibility. 
In structuring these drcles, we may seem a bit mechanical; that is 
because the meanings (literal, poetic, and structural) of Heidegger's terms 
are bdng used as instructions. The intention is not to caned the poetry of 
the text, nor its evasion of the metaphysical, but to place its structure on 
exhibit, and to render Heidegger's implidt, fluid interrelations explicit not 
in language, but in a topological dynamic of intertwining form and content. 
This ecology of drcles discloses itself as a sign that floats up out of the 
depths of the text, and which will carry us back down into it. 
It may be worth noticing at this point that because understanding is 
already an assignment of significance, it appears as prior familiarity with 
the objed. That is, understanding reveals itself as primordial recognition, a 
recognition constituted by an unrecognized past. In finding (attributed) 
significance, understanding is telling a story about itself that it no longer 
remembers-a journey through the interstices of its own historicity, a 
journey through objectivity that reflects yet veils an (un)remembered 
event. Thus, Hddegger reveals something crudal for any understanding 
of consdousness (or consdousness of understanding); viz. that recognition 
precedes cognition. It is a mediation in a process of "attention to"' 9 that 
19Dasein is usually translated as Being-there. But the "there" is not only 
being, or relational; it is also a dirededness that brings one there, with 
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cannot escape apprehending the world as meanings. Heidegger's 
"understanding" frees him from the enigma of Husserl's noema (in its dis-
incarnation, its eternality, its presencelessness seemingly stretched 
between memory and ideology, as an allegory for perception). 
The Eighth Circle 
Like Dante, Heidegger has reserved the penultimate circle for the use 
(or abuse) of language. Our guide informs us that we are entering the 
circle of assertion. The eighth circle completes our topology; it is the final 
stage in specification, in which the object is grasped. Since language 
follows assertion in Heidegger's analytic, it should find itself in the ninth 
circle, where all that precedes becomes frozen, written, metaphysical. 
Though we are headed that way, and were promised that the drcle could 
be seen from the center, it seems to be precisely where Heidegger does 
not want to go, what he remains indedsive on, as Guignon has pointed out. 
Assertion is a pointing out which gives something a definite charader 
and which communicates.O 99) 
Heidegger structures assertion as a triad, but this time as a triad of 
significations. (196) Signification differs from significance as quiddity does 
from existence. Where significance constitutes a that-ness that means the 
object, signification is meaning's what-ness-its properties. 
Assertion's first signification is that it is a 'pointing out' ("letting an entity 
be seen from itself"-196). Its second is predication, in the sense of the 
entity being given a definite character. And the third is communication, 
"letting someone see with us"; the entity is something to be shared with 
others (as predication) or passed on by "retelling" (re-predication). 
'Pointing out' is to be distinguished from 'representation' in that it lacks 
the (psychic) distance implied by representation. As an involvement in 
"there-ness," a directed attention to the object, to the "as-something," it is 
what returns the objectivity of the object to seeing; one "sees for oneself," 
just as interpretation returns understanding to "understanding for itself." 
"Predication" is a retrieval of what is assigned as there-ness; the object 
pointed out is grasped (reconceptualized and reappropriated). Predication 
exists only if it is a pointing out (197); it is the form taken by pointing out. 
And finally, communication is founded on the situation that an entity is 
given predication, yet is not close enough to be directly pointed out. It 
communicates by being the objectification of distant there-ness. Thus, 
communication is the form taken by predication, in which it finds its 
content. And it is a pointing out, because it signifies the entity, while 
remaining independent of it. That is, communication takes the form of a 
attention, as in "being there for" the object of that attention - being in the 
situation of paying attention to something. 
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pointing out, for which it is, itself, the content. Assertion is again a triadic 
circle.2® 
We now have a triad of significance, understanding, and assertion, 
whose structure is again circular. Assertion is involved in, assigns, and 
objectifies understanding (that is, it returns to the understanding-circle 
through the mediation of the significance-circle). It is the possibility of, the 
projection of, and the interpretation of significance (that is, the 
significance-circle returns to it mediated by the understanding-circle). 
And understanding points out, predicates, and communicates significance 
(the understanding-circle returns to the significance-circle mediated by 
the assertion-circle). Mediation, the inner workings of the Always Already, 
returns each index as a form to what is its content. In so doing, it reveals 
that each mediating index is, in fact, the content of the index it finds as its 
form.21 
The sculpture is complete. It is topologically the place where 
consciousness sites itself (in significance), sights itself (in understanding) 
and cites itself (in assertion). Its formal significance resides in the 
inseparability of its terms. Wrested from this 'nest', each term becomes 
unintelligible—a fish out of water—something that must invent 
(metaphysical) determinations to cover the indeterminateness creating by 
separation. Alone, each becomes self-defining, finding only the circularity 
of definition as its foundation. 
The Analysand and the Ninth Circle 
We are poised on the Hp of Cocytus, where everything freezes in stasis. 
What do cyclicity and directedness Imply? 
First, the interlocking of the supra-logical circle establishes it as an 
organic whole. Heidegger begins with traditional terms taken from 
traditional accounts of consciousness, and In circumnavigating 
metaphysics, allows them to fall through the center. Mind's thingness is 
gone; all that remains is the inseparability of elements that had always 
before been separate. His sculpture is an analysand, the hidden 
20Each signification increases the distance from the object, and becomes a 
further point of reference to it. The recognized object becomes the 
perceived object, still within the ontological structure of "objectivity." The 
act of assertion is an act of reference — necessarily by a subject, but one 
which is not dual to its object. Both subject and object are hidden inside 
the dynamics of the circle. 
2 1The overall configuration of this sculpture can be conceived as a nesting 
of circles of circles. From the innermost: the fore-structure is a circle of 
circles; it is one element on the interpretation-circle, which is a circle of 
circles; the interpretation-circle is one element of the understanding-
circle, which is a circle of circles; and the understanding-circle is one 
element of the total circle of significance, understanding, and assertion. 
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ontological whole, already forgotten, from which these traditional terms 
had already unknowingly been wrested—like the elephant in the parable of 
the five blind men, each of whom touches it in a different place, and gives 
a different account. 
Heidegger was looking for foundations. He makes reference to triadic 
unitarity as a foundation where no foundation is possible. (192) But it is 
only the cyclicity of an evasion of metaphysics that obviates foundations. 
(Where grounding is circular, and grounds only what grounds it in turn, 
then only the circle itself is ground.) For instance, cyclicity posits the 
priority of textuality to definition (something Derrida has repeatedly 
demonstrated by employing the formalisms of the ontological circle (circle 
#2)). Textual cyclicity engenders a transcendence of definition because in 
it definition itself must be derived from what it defines. That is, 
terminology is contextually determined by the text its terms engender. 
This is the essence of the poetic; because the poem is a sign that refers 
esentially only to itself, the words that compose it ultimately obtain their 
meaning from the sign they themselves engender as a context. It is this 
which opens poetic language to a circumvention of metaphysics. Without 
cyclicity, one enshrines oneself in definitions, in the univocity of 
metaphysics, in sentences floating in mid-air, like a cord thrown off a cliff 
as a signal, and lazily falling into the darkness. 
Let us move a little beyond the sculpture a moment. The essential 
nature of consciousness, for which foundations are sought, is a process of 
discovery that engenders what it will discover; it is self-referentiality. The 
form is its own foundation. Its spontaneity and autonomy can see in 
themselves only spontaneity and autonomy. If something were not self-
determined, it would be apprehensible as undetermined by the act of 
looking; it would be 'there* to be attended to, rather than 'there' as 
"attention to." Two things meet that description: memory and the means of 
articulation (language and the literary). These are, respectively, what 
precedes attribution, and succeeds assertion; i.e. what lies outside the 
Heideggerian sculpture. One enters the sculpture from what came before, 
and one leaves across the frozen expanse of articulation. 
The issue of memory shifts the question of foundations. No foundation 
is possible if no intentional account of memory is given.22 One of the 
fascinations with Heidegger is the mystery that is silhouetted by his 
understanding-circle, in which recognition appears prior to cognition. This 
22The question of intentional memory is an unsolved problem because it is 
a contradictory notion. Memory refers to what is remembered, and can be 
brought to mind. To intend something is to have it in mind, or to be 
mindful of it, in the sense of an attention to it. What then could the notion 
of intentional remembering mean? If it is intended, it is in mind and need 
not be recalled. If it needs to be brought to mind, then how can it be 
intended? Yet recall is well- directed, and generally precise. 
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priority is real, but meaningless without an account of memory. Intentional 
memory answers the question: how do we think this thought rather than 
that one, speak this word rather than that? Intentional memory is the 
thought that Heidegger has left unthought. Without it, the 'thinker' 
returns to passivity. This omission produces the hiatus in Heidegger's text, 
because memory is the required bridge between the Anyone, the context 
for language, and Dasein. In Its absence, the fore-structure becomes the 
representative of what must lie at the heart of every act of every word 
spoken, of every recognition. It becomes the Anyone without the Other-a 
self divided against itself as other. 
The question of language, still undecided, now takes on a more ominous 
meaning. If it lies at the center, in the ninth drcle, then Heidegger turns 
away from it. Perhaps, he intuited that only disappearance, either in 
ellipsis or in metaphysics, would ensue from a leap into the center. He 
drcles back, asking why it is valid to consider assertion as a mode of 
interpretation. And he finds nothing to found validity. Here too, the circle 
Is essential 
"Validity" can be seen in three ways: first, as a judgment validity being 
the "form of aduality"; second, as a word refering to the validity of the 
meaning of a judgement - I.e. the referent having an 'objectively valid 
character' (objectivity); and third, as a meaning given as valid for 
everybody—i.e. as a bindingness. Heidegger shows that actuality, 
objectivity, and bindingness become confused with each other, leaving the 
notion opaque. (198) But the drcle forms an analysand within which the 
three forms of 'validity' make sense. If we translate the grammatical forms 
for validity in the original German, we find the following: 1) the gerund 
'validity' (being valid); 2) the noun 'validness'-valid character; 3) the verb 
'to be valid'. These braid themselves. The way of being valid finds its form 
in valid character, and valid character finds its form in what is being valid 
(for everyone). Similarly, being valid provides the content for the notion of 
a valid character, or objectivity; and the fact of having a valid character 
provides the content for bindingness, for validity for everyone. Finally, the 
drcle closes because actuality is the form of bindingness for everyone—i.e. 
what is accepted as true (as predicated) in its actuality in a community. In 
sum, objectivity is the form taken by the actual, which then points to what 
is the actual for that community. 
We recognize the drcle of significance, understanding, and assertion 
writ small. This triadic unity of the actuality of significance, the objectivity 
of understanding, and the bindingness of assertion, is validity itself. Not 
simply the 'content of judgment' (199), it is the emergence into the 
'judgment of content', and characterizes Heidegger's very project toward 
understanding. 
In effect, this validlty-drcle presents a picture of mythic structure. If 
myth, in its narrative function, is what gives a community its common 
language (and thus renders its emotional and social relationships 
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discernible, apprehensible), then mythic structure is precisely the positing 
of what is valid for a community; and it resides behind the totality of 
community dialogue. As such, it is elliptical, hidden and only silhouetted 
by its circumscribing analysand, the totality of community dialogue itself. 
The ellipsis in the validity-circle, as mythic, is precisely what Heidegger 
wished to leap into. But at the brink of Cocytus, he turned back. It was 
opaque for him down there. Thus, what he left out is the role of narrative in 
the generation of language. And narrative, as the transcendence of the 
general by the particular, is the other form whereby discourse evades 
metaphysics. This suggests that Heidegger leaves language unclarified 
because he does not see the dynamic of the circles his triads drew in 
potentia.23 In the absence of a place for validity, language is trapped 
within its written poetic. 
What is the abyss? The significance-circle is a text, a braid of form and 
content. As it re-expresses itself (finds new content) in the circles of 
understanding and assertion, it sculpts, In the abstract, a sign: a sign which 
enacts a theory and practise of there-ness, a source and echo of meaning, 
and a discovery in engenderment of the object. Rather than a meaningless 
"thingness" for mind, this textual sculpture presents an icon of "attention 
to." Elliptically, it enacts the essential structure of intentionallty. In other 
words, Heidegger's text contains a theory of intentionallty silhouetted 
within the whorls and interstices of his sculpture, and his journey is a 
descent to the ellipsis at its center. There, superimposed upon the effaced 
metaphysics, resides the silhouette, an absence cohabiting with what seeks 
to write it as a text. This is the inarticulable in Heidegger's text, the account 
of intentionallty that he outlines, circumscribes, and leaves untouched in 
its circular abyss. 
The notion of superimposed silhouette within his circles of circles 
suggests that Heidegger's account Is a photographic negative of 
metaphysics. In a photo-negative, objects in the positive are mapped onto 
spaces, and spaces onto objects. What is real for metaphysics becomes 
transient, airy in the spinning of Heidegger's wheels, the ellipsis of Being's 
endless circumscription; and what is real for him is left empty for 
metaphysics in his non-articulations. The forward and backward analytic 
reveals no change of place, only a reversal of entity hood. This, then, 
accounts for the schizophrenia of the text. Its indices (as quantum 
numbers for Dasein as "attention to") present themselves as wholes, while 
^Part of the reason is that he conceives of Dasein as not being circular. 
Dasein is not present-at-hand (361), and thus what holds for Dasein does 
not hold for anything that is present-at-hand. "If we note that 'circularity' 
belongs ontologically to a kind of Being which is present-at-hand, we must 
altogether avoid using this phenomenon to characterize anything like 
Dasein ontologically." (195) In the sense of circularity Taminiaux is 
speaking about, it is not (see note 3). 
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withdrawing to synechdochic outline. The meaning is in effect in the form, 
while the form looks for itself in the meaning. The text is in a rhetorical 
double bind. 
In a sense, this essay remanifests all this In form. As a critique, It is the 
articulation, the rewriting, of the unwritten and destined to be miswritten 
text of Heidegger. Thus, it is circular. As a discourse on Heidegger's 
sculptural form, it has rendered Heidegger's clearings objects for study. 
Hence, it is the photo-negative of Heidegger's text. And in painting a 
metaphorology from Dante's Inferno on the body of Heidegger's text, it 
has in a sense, narrativized it. That is, it Is itself schizophrenic. 
Narrativization does not turn Heidegger into a story; the Heidegger-Dante 
connection is invented. Rather, the narrative is transformed into a means 
of discourse. As a sign system, the narrative is a way of seeing what cannot 
be seen, a lens through which something is "seen in a different light." It is a 
process of mythiflcation. What Is a metaphor structure for the writer 
becomes a myth structure for the reader. 
Heidegger's Inferno makes possible a psycho-political hypothesis about 
him. Understanding, for Heidegger, is hermetic; all of its elements come 
back to themselves. He does not see the dynamic of their doing so, only 
the fact of it. Can we say he was attracted to hermeticism? The opacity of 
validity for him leaves him without myth, and therefore without 
community. Community for him is not based on narrative, but on "das 
Man," which produces language. His hermeticism separates him from 
community, while co- opting its terms. He attempts to "destroy" their 
meanings, (or "deconstruct" them, as Derrida says), but In so doing, encysts 
them. Perhaps that is why the destruction of human meaning in the 
demogogy of the early 1930s seduced him. In addition, he remains without 
an account of memory. Memory becomes "das Man" itself. To bridge the 
gap of separation, he forces Being-ln-the-world and "das Man" together, 
and resides within this artificial union. Perhaps this artificial junction 
explains why he was attracted to an artificial community. He is trapped in 
this Inferno, encircled and facing the abyss of his own absence of 
circularity, of ground. 
